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Jabour v. Law Society of British Columbia et al,1: 
Application o f the Combines Investigation Act2 to 
a Provincially Created Professional Society.
CASE SUMMARY
T h e  appellant Jab o u r advertised his legal clinic in British Columbia 
by m eans o f new spapers and an illum inated sign on his office building. 
T h e  responden t Benchers o f the British Columbia Law Society moved to 
discipline Jab o u r for “conduct unbecom ing a m em ber” u n d er provisions 
o f its enabling statute, the Legal Professions Act.3 T h e  appellant moved that 
the B encher’s restrictions on advertising were in vilation o f the Combines 
Investigation Act (the Act) and in particular o f the 1975 am endm ents to 
section 32.4 At the British Columbia Suprem e C ourt, it was found that the 
Act did apply, on the g round  that while the Benchers had the power to 
regulate advertising, they had no such power to prohibit. At the C ourt of 
Appeal level, this régulation-prohibition distinction was rejected. Seaton 
J.A . stated in his ju d g m en t that com bines legislation does not apply to 
regulatory schemes validly established by provincial legislation. On appeal 
to the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada, Estey J. speaking for the C ourt again 
found that the Act did not apply to the activities o f the Benchers, for the 
reason that the necessary requirem ents o f section 32 were not present.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Legislation:
In 1975, the Combines Investigation Act underw ent considerable am end­
m ent. T his was no less the case in the sections under the heading “O ffences 
in Relation to C om petition” and in particular, for the purposes o f the Jabour 
case, subjection 32(1). Subsection 32(1) provides:
Everyone who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person . . .
(c) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, manufacture, 
purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply o f  an article . . .
(d) to restrain or injure trade or commerce in relation to any article; 
is guilty o f  an indictable offence . . . (author’s emphasis).
’R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 214 (now the  Barristers and Solicitors Act, R.S.B.C., 1979, c. 26.) 
♦S.C., 1974-75-76, c. 76.
*(1982), 137 D.L.R. (3d), 1. (S.C.C.)
«R.S.C., 1970, c. C-23.
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In 1970, the term  “article” in subsection 1(1) was defined as “an article 
o r commodity that may be the subject o f trade o r com m erce”. In short, 
subsection 32(1) did not apply to the supply o f a service o r in particular 
to combines that m ight arise within professional societies. In 1975 am end­
ments m ade it clear that section 32 was to apply to services and professions. 
T h ere  were changes in the text o f section 32 itself which reads as follows:
(c) to prevent, or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, manufacture, 
purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply o f a product
or
(d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition induly, (author’s emphasis) 
is guilty o f an indictable offence . . .
Directly bearing on subsection 32(1) were the substantial changes in 
the definition section. In particular, in subsection 32(1) “article” was re ­
placed by the term  “product”; “product” being defined in subsection 1(1) 
o f the am endm ents as including an article and a service. In tu rn , “service” 
was defined as “a service o f any description w hether industrial, trade or 
professioanl o r otherw ise”. Clearly, Parliam ent intended to include com­
bines arising in the supply o f services and the professions within the scope 
o f the Act. T he  question to which the Suprem e C ourt directs itself in the 
Jabour case is what are the scope o f these provisions, particularly in relation 
to professional societies created by valid provincial enactm ent?
A final change in section 32 o f the Act should be noted. Subsection 
32(6) added a defence to provide specifically for professional “combines". 
Subsection 32(6) provides:
In a prosecution under subsection (1), the court shall not convict the accused if 
it finds that the conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement relates only 
to a service and to standards o f competence and integrity that are reasonably necessary for 
the protection of the public . . . (author’s emphasis)
B. Case Law
As may be surm ised from  the facts, the prim ary issue arising in the 
Jabour case is w hether the Act and it’s am endm ents apply to a professional 
legal society created by, and acting under a valid provincial statute. Cases 
most closely on point are those which Estey J. in his judgm en t refers to as 
the “regulated-industries cases”5 or, cases where regulatory schemes, set 
up under provincial legislation were questioned in term s oftheir violation 
o f the federal Act. Clearly, such regulatory schemes and groups acting 
thereunder may have the effect o f restricting com petition in the supply o f 
the products with which they deal. T he very purpose for these schemes is 
the control o f a product. However, the courts have consistently found that 
the Act does not apply in these cases.
5Supra, footnote 1, at 31.
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O ne o f the m ajor cases considering the relationship o f a provincial 
regulatory scheme to the Act is the Reference Re the Farm Products M arketing  
Act.6 In  that case, it was argued that O ntario  was prevented from enacting 
certain provisions in the Farm Products M arketing Act because they violated 
the Act. T he  Suprem e C ourt found that the Act did not apply. Rand J. put 
the m atter quite clearly in his jud g m en t when he stateu that:
T he provisions o f  the Combines Investigation Act and the Criminal Code en­
visage voluntary combinations or agreements by individuals against the public 
interest that violate their prohibitions. The public interest in trade regulation is 
not within the purview o f Parliament as an object against which its enactment 
are directed.7
Obviously, the “contrary to public in terest” requirem ent of a combine 
is crucial in analyzing these cases involving provincial statutes since a prov­
incial statute is presumably passed in the public interest. This point is again 
m ade in a case considered by Seaton J.A . in the C ourt o f Appeal: Cherry 
v. The King, ex. rel Wood *
Moreover, it surely cannot be successfully argued that a board, in exercising the 
powers conferred upon it by the Legislature and which are designed to regulate 
and control the production, processing and distribution o f a commodity in the 
Province "having regard primarily to the interests o f the public and to the 
continuity and quality o f  supply” renders itself liable to a prosecution under s.
498 . . .  (Criminal Code).9
In essence, these cases and others considering the same issue state that 
adherence to a provincial statute cannot “unduly” restrict com petition in 
the supply o f  a product. Presumably, by analogy, it would appear that a 
professional society created in the public interest by provincial statute could 
not “unduly” restrict com petition in the sense required  by the Combines 
Investigation Act.
THE PRESENT CASE
As stated in the previous section, the case law with respect to the 
application o f the Act to provincially created trade regulatory groups is 
quite straightforward;- i.e., the outcom e being that in the case o f a prov­
incially created “com bine”, the Act does not apply. T h e  significant issue in 
the Jabour case is; does the Act apply to professional societies created by 
provincial statute? T h e  Suprem e C ourt answers this question in the negative 
and thus avoids having to answer what would be a very difficult constitu­
tional question: If the Act does apply, is it in that respect intra vires the 
Parliam ent o f  C anada?10 Put simply, since the Act does not apply to the
»[1938] 1 D.L.R. 156.
Vbtd , at 162.
i0Supra, footnote 1, at 5.
6( 1957), S.C.R. 198.
7Ibid., at 219-20.
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Law Society o f British Columbia, there is no need to question the consti­
tutionality o f its application. In com ing to this decision, Estey J. for the 
most part upholds the British Columbia C ourt o f Appeal decision o f Seaton 
J.A . Much o f the case is devoted to an analysis o f the .Art and its am endm ents 
and the regulated-industries cases. Estey J. rejects the contention o f the 
appellant that such cases be given a narrow  reading. T h e  appellants had 
put forw ard two argum ents in this reg a rd .11 First, they argued that the 
regulated-industries cases be restricted to the m arketing o f natural p ro d ­
ucts. T h e  second contention (one having m ore merit) was that such cases 
should only apply w here the statute prom ulgates a com plete regulatory 
scheme; i.e. these cases should not apply in the Jabour case because there 
is no specific provision in the Legal Professions Act dealing with advertising. 
This argum ent had also been rejected by Seaton J.A . in the C ourt o f Appeal. 
His response to this contention was as follows:
One attempt was based on a study that revealed that in most or all of the cases 
the power was found to have been specifically granted. It is then said that the 
power to prohibit advertising is not specifically granted to the Benchers and 
therefore the cases do not apply. Whether the powers have been granted to the 
regulatory body in specific language as opposed to broad general language, does 
not offer a valid distinction. The essential thing is that the power be granted.12
Estey J. in exam ining the regulated-industries cases comes to the con­
clusion that there  has been in such cases a requirem ent that in o rd e r to 
fall within the Act, there  m ust be som ething “unduly”, or contrary to the 
public interest for those sections to apply .13 Estey J . then makes the fol­
lowing im portan t statem ent, which clearly dem onstrates the eventual o u t­
come o f the case:
So long as the CIA, or at least Part V, is styled as a criminal prohibition, pro­
ceedings in its implementation and enforcement will require a demonstration 
o f some conduct contrary to the public interest. It is this element o f the federal 
legislation that these cases all conclude can be negated by the authority extended  
by a valid provincial regulatory statute.14
From this statem ent, we see again the prem ise underlying all o f  these 
cases; i.e., specifically, that a provincial statute is inherently m ade in the 
public interest. T h e  argum ent runs as follows: Since the Act extends only 
to actions contrary to the public interest, and a provincial statute is m ade 
in the public interest, the Act does not apply to a provincial statute.
Not surprisingly then, Estey J ., comes to the conclusion that the Act 
does not apply to the actions o f the Benchers or the Law Society.15 W hat
vlJabour v. Law Society of British Columbia ft al. (1980), 115 D.L.R. (3d) 549 at 567. 
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is somewhat surprising however, is that this is not in the end  the point that 
Estey J . emphasizes. Rather, he turns to the opening words o f subsection 
32(1) where it states; “Every one who conspires, combines, agrees o r a r­
ranges with ano ther person”, and finds that such agreem ent must be vol­
untary. He then points ou t that there can not be such a voluntary agreem ent 
in this case because the Benchers are acting according to their statutory 
m andate:
In the words o f Rand J. in Farm Products Reference, supra, at p. 278 D.L.R., at 
pp. 219-20 S.C.R., the. provincial statute is “coercive” as applied to members o f  
the provinciallv-regulated group, whereas the statute is directed towards vol­
untary combinations or agreem ents.16 •
A final argum ent put forw ard by the appellants concerned subsection 
32(6).17 Briefly, the argum ent was to the effect that subsection 32(6) by 
providing a defence w here the agreem ent “relates only to a service and to 
standards o f com petence and integrity that are reasonably necessary for 
the protection o f the public,” Parliam ent intended to extend section 32 to 
include such professional groups as the Benchers. Both the C ourt o f Appeal 
and the Suprem e C ourt reject this contention. By applying clear and logical 
principles o f statutory construction, Estey J . determ ined that the defence 
o f subsection 32(6) would only arise if the respondents came within the 
in tended scope o f section 32 as given by subsection (1):
in my view, ss. (6) does not operalae to make a fundamental change to the plain 
meaning o f the main operating provision o f the section, that is ss. (1) o f  s. 32.
By its own terms, ss. (6) is a limited directive to a court hearing a charge under 
ss. (1). It is to ss. (1) that one must look to determine the breadth of the parlia­
mentary grasp . . .  A defence creating provision is hardly an appropriate place 
to find an expansion o f the changing provision.18
THE ANALYSIS
T he decision in the Jabour case appears to be an ex ension o f the 
principles laid down in the regulated-industries cases as to (he relationship 
between bodies created by provincial statute and the application o f the 
Combines Investigation Act. Surely, the activities o f such bodies may for some 
purposes fall within section 32 o f the Act. At the same time however, it 
m ust be recognized that the necessaary “mens rea" to create a combine 
requires voluntary agreem ent, and this elem ent is lacking when we are 
dealing with a body carrying out its statutory m andate. Perhaps m ore im­
portan t is the “unduly” requirem ent; i.e., that the combine be contrary to 
the public interest. Since a provincial statute is by its very nature in the
,6Ibid., at 37.
•7/W .. at 38.
"Ibid., at 39-40.
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public interest, it is at once illogical to say that such bodies be considered 
as combines. T h erefo re , one is pushed to the conclusion that such groups 
are outside the scope o f the Act as it presently stands.
“As it presently stands”, is an im portant statem ent in term s o f the 
constitutional question that was not dealt with in the Jabour case. It should 
be recognized that this case does not decide that the Act cannot apply to 
such provincially established bodies as the Law Society o f British Columbia. 
This issue was never dealt with because it was found that the Act as it stands 
does not apply to such groups. This is not to say that Parliam ent cannot 
legislate to m ake such provincially created bodies a com bine un d er the Act. 
T o take this from  the case would be to m isread Mr. Justice Estey’s decision.
T he  decision o f the Suprem e C ourt rests upon a fundam ental principle 
o f statutory construction that federal and provincial acts should be read 
together so that they may exist consistently and harm oniously with one 
another. Behind this m ethod o f construction, it must be recognized that 
there is a distinct judicial approach to questions dealing with possible con­
flicts between federal and provincial legislation; i.e., they are to be read so 
as to give them  the greatest possible independence within their spheres o f 
jurisdiction. T his judicial approach to in terpretation seems to be a con­
sistent one at least on the part o f Estey J . In a recent case, A.-G. Quebec &  
Keable v. A.-G. Can. et a /.19 (which Seaton J.A . notes at the Court o f Appeal 
level in the Jabour case),20 Estey J. has this to say:
Difficulty in ascertaining the precise boundary in specific circumstances is no 
reason to withdraw from the responsibility o f  enumerating a constitutional doc­
trine which recognizes the validity o f the exclusive authorities in the subsections 
o f ss. 91 and 92 respectively.21
As a final question, it may be asked which services and professional 
groups will come within the scope o f the A ct? It would appear that the Act 
would apply to such professional groups and societies that are not created 
o r regulated by provincial statute. A lthough this was not the precise ques­
tion before the Suprem e C ourt, Estey J. in obiter had these wcrds to say:
There are o f  course in our community endless associations, professional and 
otherwise, voluntarily established and embracing persons carrying on activities 
social, commercial, professional and otherwise, wbich have no statutory mandate 
in the sense o f a governing body o f a profession. It may well be that it was the 
intent o f  Parliament to include in ss. (6) (or ss. (1)) such non-statutory bodies.22
I9[ 1979] 1 S.C.R. 218.
20Supra, footnote 12, at 564.
i lSupra, footnote 19, at 259.
Supra, footnote 1, at 40.
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CONCLUSIONS
T he effects o f the Jab o u r decision are far-reaching in term s o f sub­
sequent in terpretation  o f the Combines Investigation Act am endm ents and 
their application to professional societies. Firstly, and quite particularly, it 
appears that provincially created legal societies across Canada are now free 
from  action in term s o f violation o f the Act as it presently exists. Secondly, 
the Act's provisions as to restriction o f com petition in a profession have 
arguably been strictly limited in that these sections likely will not be found 
to apply to any professional body created by valid provincial statute.
In one sense, this is a landm ark case in that it determ ines what profes­
sional groups o r services are to be excluded from  the Act. From another 
perspective however, this case only extends the principles that have already 
been established and applied in the regulated-industries cases.
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